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IS WHAT’S YOURS REALLY MINE?: SHMUELI V.
CORCORAN GROUP AND PENUMBRAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Lee Nolan Jacobs∗
As technology advances, the government has attempted
to enact policy that protects the delicate balance between
the demands for technological change and the need to
protect an individual’s right[s] . . . . As a nation, we have
supported laws that protect us from our neighbors and our
government spying on us and invading our privacy,
everywhere but in the workplace.1
INTRODUCTION
As computer use increasingly permeates all aspects of society,
including both high level and menial employment, the notion of a
legitimate property right in the ownership of both personal and
work products is in a state of flux.2 No clear doctrine exists to
∗
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1
139 CONG. REC. S6122 (daily ed., May 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Paul
Simon).
2
H. Joseph Wen and Pamela Gersuny, Computer-Based Monitoring in the
American Workplace: Surveillance Technologies and Legal Challenges, 24
HUMAN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 165, 166 (2005). As of September 2001, 174
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determine who maintains the rights to and interests in documents
created and maintained with the assistance of computer networks.3
In essence it must be asked, what happens to the employee who is
able to write the great American novel during his or her unpaid
break periods, while still satisfying all work requirements? Who
maintains rights over the document, the employee or employer?
Under the current law, this writer might not be able to retrieve his
or her product if he or she was suddenly terminated. That would
leave the employer with the rights to a document that is clearly not
within the purview of the business and which belongs to the
employee.
Recently, the Supreme Court of New York in Shmueli v.
Corcoran Group4 ruled that the common law concept of
conversion can apply when an employer unlawfully takes a former
independent contractor’s personal electronic documents.5
million people—66% of the U.S. population—were using computers in their
homes, schools, libraries, and work. In the workplace, 65 million of the 115
million employed adults age 25 and over, almost 57% used a computer at work.
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: HOW AMERICANS ARE
EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET (2002).
3
Throughout this Note’s entirety, the term computer networks will be used
as a catch-all to describe the tools that an employee uses to create documents.
This term includes the use of a single computer using basic software
applications which is not connected to a network of other computers and servers,
to a fully network integrated environment where users share network resources
such as file-servers, networked applications, and Internet access. See generally
JOHN W. SATZINGER ET. AL., SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 302 (2nd ed. 2002)
(defining a computer network as “a set of transmission lines, equipment and
communication protocols to permit sharing of information and resources.”).
4
802 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2005). This decision is a result of the
defendant’s (Corcoran Group) motion for summary judgment to dismiss
Shmueli’s complaint.
5
Electronic documents refer to any type of file that is kept in an electronic
format which includes is but not limited to the following: word processing,
spreadsheets, and images. However, for the purposes of this Note, electronic
documents will be limited to those documents which could be easily printed on
paper into a classical tangible form.
While the handwritten . . . is a ‘literal’ document, the computerized one
is . . . ‘virtual’ . . . [which can] . . . transform to literal . . . by [using the]
printing key function . . . Electronically written ‘documents’ should not
be treated with less dignity . . . than ink written ‘documents.’ The
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Although this court does hold that an independent contractor’s
electronic documents are subject to the tort of conversion,6 it does
not fully explain the application of property rights concerning
electronic documents between traditional employers and
employees.
Currently, federal law and most state law recognizes that all
employees have a pre-existing personal privacy interest, as well as
a security interest, in their electronic documents.7 However, the
law as it stands today affords no property protections over personal
electronic documents created or maintained by employees on their
employer’s computer network. This Note proposes, through
reasoning by interpolation (or the logical inference making based
on the comparison of two apparent legal doctrines to create a third)
as applied at the overlap of privacy and security interests, a
property right is generated.8
The New York Supreme Court’s decision in Shmueli represents
a microcosm of the shortcomings of the current prevailing law. In
granting an electronic document the same level of protections as its
hard-copy counterpart, the Shmueli court’s holding keeps the law
somewhat in step with the pace of technological change.9
However, as this Note argues, greater continued protection is
necessary for electronic documents. The decision fails to address
how computer use has made it far easier for employers to intrude
upon the privacy rights of employees and thereby infringe on
employee property rights as well.10 For instance, before computers,
employees had the ability to lock their documents in a file cabinet,
medium of recordation whether ancient or modern should not be
deemed germane.
Id. at 2-4.
6
Id.
7
See infra Part III for a further discussion concerning current privacy and
security protections afforded to employees in the workplace.
8
See e.g. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably
Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1997). Also see infra Part VI for an
explanation of reasoning-by-interpolation and its application to an employee’s
property rights in the workplace.
9
See infra notes 20-21.
10
See infra Part II for a further discussion concerning current employee
monitoring and surveillance practices.
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and if an employer were to go rifle through that file cabinet, it
would be fairly easy for the employee to see that something had
been moved or was missing. With computers, electronic
monitoring and surveillance gives the employer the ability to
monitor their employees’ computer and view all files,
documents—virtually everything that the employee performs on
his or her computer—without the employee ever even knowing.11
The court in Shmueli failed to take this into account, and therefore
is only paying lip service, instead of advancing the law.
This Note argues that it is inadequate for the law to give
employees the same amount of property protection over electronic
documents as over paper documents. As computer usage in the
workplaces continues to increase and substantially change the
manner in which work actually takes place, the law must evolve
and recognize the inherent property right that employees maintain
over their personal electronic documents. As the rights of
employees must be balanced against the rights of employers,
legislatures should consider statutory protections and private
parties should consider contractual remedies to ensure that the
rights of all parties—both employers and employees—are
protected.
Part I of this Note evaluates Shmueli in the context of the tort
of conversion contrasted with property and privacy rights. Part II
addresses methods and rationales of workplace surveillance.
Further, this section examines “Acceptable Use Agreements,” or
private contractual agreements entered into by employers and their
employees which govern the terms and conditions surrounding the
use of an employer’s computer network. Part III discusses
applicable state and federal statutes which affect workplace
monitoring and privacy. Part IV illustrates the standard applied to
workplace privacy cases surrounding personal electronic
documents created and maintained in the public sphere by
analyzing Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General. Parts V and VI
present the proposition that through reasoning-by-interpolation,
employees maintain property rights over their documents. Part VII
suggests statutory and private solutions which support the
11

Id.
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employer’s desire to maintain a productive work environment
while taking into consideration the employees’ fundamental
property rights over their electronic documents.
I. SHMUELI V. CORCORAN—THE DECISION
Sarit Shmueli, an independent contractor for the Corcoran
Group Real Estate Firm, was terminated on March 18, 2002.12
Shmueli was summoned into her supervisor’s office where she
received her discharge, and then returned to her desk to collect her
personal belongings, including personal files stored on her
computer.13 Specifically, she sought to gain access to an electronic
contact-list detailing the real estate transactions she had
participated in, both before and during her tenure at the Corcoran
Group.14 However, she could not collect her file because her
computer password15 had been changed.16 The court held that
Shmueli’s password presumably secured her computer documents
from being read or sent to others without her consent.17 Shmueli
never gained access to the file and as a result sued the Corcoran
Group for conversion—on grounds that this was an unlawful
taking of her computerized contact-list.18
In his decision, Justice Herman Cahn relied mainly on New
York’s common law tort of conversion to deny the defendant’s

12

Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
Id.
14
Id.
15
A computer password is the unique combination of a “username” and
“password” which grants a user access to his or her computer and/or network
resources such as printers, file servers, and other network applications. See
SATZINGER ET. AL., supra note 3, at 516.
16
Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
17
Id. at 877. The expectation of privacy that a user may have concerning
the secrecy of his or her password and the documents that he secretly stores with
that password is not guaranteed. Id.
18
Id. at 873. Shmueli also sought relief on the following causes of action:
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of bailment, misappropriation
of proprietary information, and interference with prospective business relations.
Id. However, these additional claims will not be discussed in this Note.
13
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motions for summary judgment.19 In essence, Justice Cahn asked:
[D]oes the common law tort of conversion become an
extinct vestige of the past as to documents maintained on a
computer, merely because traditional definitions of
documents evolve over time to the point where wood pulp
is no longer the only required medium upon which to
record data? Does not the concept of conversion . . .
[the] . . . wrongful exclusionary retention of an owner’s
physical property, apply to an electronic record created by a
plaintiff and maintained electronically as much as it does to
a paper record so created?20
To these questions, Justice Cahn held that the common law tort
of conversion does indeed apply to electronic documents; however,
he applies old law to new technology.21 The Shmueli opinion traces
the evolution of conversion in New York from only allowing the
conversion of tangible property, such as real property, to more
intangible forms like stock certificates and bank books.22 The
opinion continues to assert that just as owners still control property
rights over misplaced tangible property, the same rule applies to
intangible property. 23 Furthermore, Justice Cahn opined that there
is no practical reason why the same level of property protections
should not be applied to both tangible and intangible property.24
19

Id. at 875-76.
Id. at 874-75.
21
Id. at 876.
22
“As the nature of personal property evolved to the point where tangible
documents represented highly valuable rights, such as promissory notes, stock
certificates, insurance policies, and bank books, the tort of conversion was
expanded by common law courts to include such documents . . . .” Shmueli v.
Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (Sup. Ct. 2005) relying on Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 242, comment d.
23
Shmueli, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 875 relying on Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Walston & Co., Inc., 234 N.E.2d 230, 232 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1968) (citation
omitted) (holding that “an owner does not forfeit his ownership for failure to
take good care of intangible personal property any more than he forfeits it for
failure to take good care of his watch.”).
24
“There should be no reason why [a] practical view should not apply
equally to the present generation of documents . . . which are just as vulnerable
to theft and wrongful transfer as paper documents, if, indeed, not even more so.”
20
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In upholding the notion that intangible property can be subject
to conversion, the court relied on two federal cases: Kremen v.
Cohen25 and Astroworks Inc., v. Astroexhibit, Inc.26 Both cases
present and defend the proposition that certain types of intangible
property are susceptible to the tort of conversion despite the
common law notion that the tort of conversion applies only to
tangible property.27 In Kremen, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained how tort law once delineated between tangible and
intangible property28—namely, that conversion was originally a
remedy for the wrongful taking of another’s tangible property.29
However, virtually every jurisdiction has discarded this rigid
limitation to some degree.30 In Astroworks, the Southern District
of New York held that, while an idea itself is incapable of being
converted, the tangible expression of an idea is capable of being
converted.31 Thus, an important aspect of the Kremen and
Astroworks decisions is the notion that intangible property can be
converted and its storage, either on paper or in electronic medium,
is immaterial.32
Finding the aforementioned federal cases analogous to the
situation presented in Shmueli, the New York court held that the
contact-list in question was covered by the common law tort of
conversion.33 The court believed that if it did not find the contactShmueli, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
25
337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant was liable for
the theft of plaintiff’s Internet domain name).
26
257 F. Supp. 2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reasoning that the plaintiff sued
former business partner for the conversion of business ideas for his own gain).
27
See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 and Astroworks, 257 F. Supp. 2d 609.
28
Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030.
29
Id.
30
Id. See also Courtney W. Franks, Analyzing the Urge to Merge:
Conversion of Intangible Property and the Merger Doctrine in the Wake of
Kremen v. Cohen, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 489, 524 (2005) (stating that “as of 1999,
every state except North Dakota [had] enacted some legislation addressing
electronic records . . . indicating the inroads that technology has made on our
laws and society.”) (citations omitted).
31
Astroworks, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
32
Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2003).
33
Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
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list convertible, then an entire class of property—electronic
property—would fail to benefit from remedies of the tort of
conversion.34 Ultimately, the court held that electronic documents
should not be excluded from the remedies of conversion suits just
because a document was kept in electronic format rather than on
paper.35 In essence, Justice Cahn attempted to keep the law in
check with the pace of technological change, but failed to actually
do so. Rather than apply antiquated standards to a new breed of
property, the court should have continued its forward-thinking
policy and applied new law and new criterion to new technology.
Although Justice Cahn ultimately concluded that Shmueli did
maintain property rights over her electronic contact-list, the
holding is limited to the specific facts of this case.36 Most notably,
the court’s reliance on the fact that Shmueli was an independent
contractor likely signifies that the holding is inapplicable to
employees in general.37 In essence, the court is only helping Sarit
Shmueli retrieve her document, and is providing little guidance to
employers or employees on how to settle issues involving property
rights over personal documents kept at work.38 Under the holding
in Shmueli, employees in traditional “at-will” work relationships
have no rights to secure their personal electronic documents.39
Limiting the Shmueli holding to the specific facts of the case
forecloses any and all possible remedies for potential-plaintiff “atwill” employees who are aware that their electronic documents
have been taken as well as those who are unaware that their
documents have been taken.40
34

Id. at 877. Justice Cahn continued to opine that the public would perceive
that the law would be unable to evolve at the same pace as technology. Id.
35
Id. at 876 n.4.
36
Id. at 876.
37
Id. at 876 n.5. “The within holdings are not intended to extend to cases
involving employees (as opposed to independent contractors), as it is generally
held that an employee’s work product is proprietary to the employer.” Id.
38
Id. at 876.
39
Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 n.5 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
40
Id. See infra Part II for a further discussion concerning how current
technology affords the possibility that documents could be taken from an owner
without their consent. Furthermore, the tort of conversion may be an unavailable
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II. WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE
Although Shmueli supports the proposition that electronic
documents are susceptible to the tort of conversion,41 the opinion
lacks guidance on how employers can balance the need to protect
company work product while shielding themselves from a
conversion suit for an employee’s personal property. Without
proper guidelines as to who maintains property rights over
electronic documents created or maintained on a computer,
employers have begun electronically monitoring their employees
in an effort to protect company work product.42 Electronic
surveillance comes in many different shapes and sizes, some of
which is regulated by contracts between employers and employees.
The sheer act of monitoring and the later taking of an employee’s
document is in effect how employers usurp an employee’s property
right over the electronic document.
A. How and Why Monitoring Takes Place
Lurking behind the computer that an employee uses is a set of
eyes that is able to monitor almost everything that takes place
during the work day.43 The most common methods of general
workplace surveillance include: recording and reviewing
employees’ telephone conversations; storing and reviewing
employees’ voicemail messages, computer files, and e-mail
remedy for employees whose documents are taken without their knowledge or
for those employees who are aware that their documents have been taken, but
who suffer no damage or losses. However, employees may be able to claim a
lesser tort, such as trespass to chattels. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
Conversion (8th. ed. 2004) (“The wrongful possession . . . of another’s property
as if it were one’s own; an act or series of acts of willful interference, without
lawful justification, with an item of property in a manner inconsistent with
another’s right, whereby that other person is deprived of the use and possession
of the property.”), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Trespass (8th. Ed. 2004)
(“The act of committing, without lawful justification, any act of direct physical
interference with a chattel possessed by another.”).
41
Shmueli, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
42
See infra Part II.A.
43
See Wen, supra note 2, at 166.
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messages; monitoring employees’ Internet connections; and
videotaping employees in the work environment.44 Rather than
passively copying the files, emails, or telephone calls that a user
may make, employers in a networked environment can actively
monitor everything that employees do at their computer. 45 This
happens without an employee’s knowledge because employers
utilize such methods as keystroke monitoring,46 events timeline
logging,47 application usage tracking,48 window activity tracing,49
and remote desktop viewing50 which are not evident to users of the
computer.
On the surface, companies may present plausible reasons for
monitoring their employees, such as the protection of propriety
information or the prevention of sexual harassment.51 However,
employee monitoring has generated apprehension from various
groups, including libertarians, corporations, and labor unions.52
44

AMA RESEARCH, 2001 AMA SURVEY: WORKPLACE MONITORING &
SURVEILLANCE (American Management Association 2001), http://www.
amanet.org/research/pdfs/ems_short2001.pdf.
45
See SATZINGER ET. AL., supra note 3, at 302.
46
Wen, supra note 2, at 167. A keystroke is the action of striking a key on
the keyboard and keystroke monitoring “maintains a record of [those]
keystrokes along with the window they are typed in and time stamp.” Id.
Keystroke monitoring also allows an employee to “recreate a ‘deleted’
document because the keystrokes are logged and stored even if deleted.” Id.
(emphasis added).
47
Timeline logging records all events users performed and allows the
viewing of all events in a chronological order as well as the ability to track all
program initiations, website visits, document viewings and printings. Id.
48
Application usage monitors and logs all applications ran by users as well
as when it was started, stopped, and how long it was used. Id
49
Window activity records all documents and files opened and viewed by
users as well as all windows in which the user directly interacts with on the
desktop, chat sessions, and username and password combinations. Id.
50
Remote desktop viewing “takes snapshots of every desktop at set
intervals of time, allowing managers to virtually see what is happening . . . [and
allows for the] . . . remote view[ing of] what the user is doing in real-time.” Id.
51
See Shari C. Lewis, Internet Monitoring: Wide Implications in Ruling on
Employee Visits to Pornographic Sites, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 7, 2006, at col.
1.
52
Wen, supra note 2, at 166.
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Each argument put forth by these different groups opposing
employee surveillance relies on varied ethical, legal, or economic
arguments which present managerial and moral dilemmas.53
Despite the lack of a conclusive argument in favor of employee
surveillance, employers continue to proffer various important
reasons for favoring monitoring. For example, the taping of certain
activities54 in regulated industries affords both the consumer and
the company some legal protection, while the sheer act itself may
merely be the simplest way for a company to maintain adequate
business records.55 Other employers report that they monitor their
employees in order to keep the company’s proprietary information
secure because e-mail and Internet access can easily permit the
information to leave company walls.56 Joseph Wen and Pamela
Gersung, noted organizational business scholars, report that
disgruntled employees have the ability
to e-mail trade secrets and confidential documents quickly
and easily to a large audience. . . . [I]n fact, most security
breaches come from knowledgeable insiders—not random
hackers from the outside. By monitoring . . . usage and
content, corporations argue that they are able to detect and
halt security breaches. Plus the mere knowledge of
increased surveillance may deter potential employee theft.57
In total, more than three quarters of major U.S. firms record
and review the actions of their employees.58 These employers posit
53

Id.
Employers can raise an affirmative defense against sexual harassment,
when the company monitors the computer network to prevent the creation of a
hostile work environment. Furthermore, states such as New Jersey are now
mandating that “an employer who is on notice that one of its employees is using
a workplace computer to access pornography, possibly child pornography, has a
duty to investigate the employee’s activities and to take prompt and effective
action to stop the unauthorized activity, lest it result in harm to innocent thirdparties.” Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
55
AMA RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 1.
56
Id.
57
Wen, supra note 2, at 167.
58
AMA RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 1. The American Management
Association’s survey of workplace surveillance included data from almost 1,700
major U.S. firms. More than 75% of responding firms gross more than $50
54
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that businesses that do not adequately monitor their systems leave
themselves open to the unlawful and undiscovered loss or
modification of proprietary business information.59
In addition to protecting proprietary information from abuse
and theft, monitoring employee work performance allows
employers to secure increased employee productivity; objective
job performance-related decisions concerning hiring, firing and
promotions, as well as liability protection from sexual harassment
charges.60 Most commonly, the decision to monitor frequently
occurs because an employer desires to limit the amount of time
their employees spend utilizing the computer for personal uses,
such as sending personal e-mails or browsing the Internet.61
Employers recognize that each moment spent using the company
computer for personal use is a waste of the company’s time and
money.62 Furthermore, the ability of employees with Internet
access to use instant messaging services,63 send personal emails, or
participate in chatrooms64 has caused the computer to top the
coffee room or talking on the telephone as the largest waste of an
employee’s on-the-job time.65 The average American worker
million in annual sales. Moreover, 13% of respondents gross annually more than
one billion dollars. Id. at 2. Furthermore, an additional study in 2003, found that
92% of employers reported that they utilize some form of electronic surveillance
to monitor their employees. CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS, Survey: ‘You’ve
Got Mail . . . And the Boss Knows’” (Bentley College) (2003).
59
Wen, supra note 2, at 167.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Instant messaging (“IM”) software “allows users to send brief remarks
that pop up on the recipient’s computer screen.” Frank C. Morris Jr. & Jennifer
S. Recine, The Electronic Platform: The Implications of Technology in the
Workplace, SK033 ALI-ABA 875, 892 (2004). In 2001, Americans spent over
4.9 billion minutes per month instant messaging one another, and “likely at least
doubled over the next two years.” Id.
64
Chatrooms allow users to “instantly communicate with each other by
typing a message that is instantly transmitted to others participating in the
chatroom.” Jennifer Kathleen Swartz, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: Do
Students Shed Their Constitutional Rights When Communicating to a CyberAudience?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 589 n.15 (2005).
65
Wen, supra note 2, at 167-68. A 2005 survey revealed that “American
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admits to wasting 2.09 hours per eight-hour workday, not
including lunch and other breaks.66 Surfing the Internet was the
largest time wasting activity, with almost 45% of all respondents
reporting that they waste time at work browsing the Internet.67 In
total, almost $340 billion per year will be spent on paying workers
for surfing the Internet while at work.68 Additionally, because
electronic monitoring and surveillance is objective,69 it allows for
employee evaluations and decisions concerning promotions and
terminations based on the results—free from prejudice, favoritism,
or other subjective reasons.70 Objective decisions discourage
disgruntled or former employees from claiming unfair treatment or
wrongful termination.71
Besides the need to protect the corporation itself, in terms of
trade secrets or productivity, businesses and corporations
nowadays must take a proactive approach to protecting their
employees from sexual harassment by other employees, as
workers are wasting more than twice the time Human Resource managers
expect.” Dan Malachowski, Wasted Time at Work Costing Companies Billions,
SALARY.COM, July 11, 2005, http://www.salary.com/careers/layoutscripts/
crel_display.asp?tab=cre&cat=nocat&ser=Ser374&part=Par555.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
In total, $759 billion will be spent on paying employees salary for
expected work which will never be preformed. The total of $340 billion was
arrived at by taking the total amount spent, $759 billion divided by 44.7%, the
percentage of browsing the Internet, which equals $339.9 billion. See id.
Regionally, employees waste the most amount of time in the Midwest, while the
least amount of time in the South. Overall, employees who reside in Missouri,
Indiana, and Kentucky waste the most amount of time, as compared to residents
of South Carolina, Rhode Island and Hawaii who waste the least. An average
employee of Missouri, Indiana, and Kentucky wastes 3.2, 2.8, and 2.8 hours
respectively, whereas residents of South Carolina, Rhode Island and Hawaii
waste only 1.3 hours per working day. Id. Workers in California on average
waste almost two and a half hours per day of work time wasting almost $38
billion, while New York employers pay their employees more than $25 billion
per year for their wasted time at work. Id.
69
R.L. Worsnop, Privacy In the Workplace, CQ RESEARCHER, Nov. 11, 19,
1993, at 1011-25.
70
Wen, supra note 2, at 168.
71
Id.
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opposed to the previous reactive practice of addressing claims of
sexual harassment only after the alleged incidents occurred.72 One
method of preventing sexual harassment fostered by a hostile work
environment is to monitor the company’s computer networks for
potentially offensive or explicit material.73 Electronic monitoring
and surveillance can “catch” offensive or explicit materials before
they can be transmitted.74 More or less, the issue comes down to a
question of duty, that is, in which situations the employer must
monitor in order to protect its own interests. In Doe v. XYC Corp, a
recent decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, the court relied
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding that the employer
must control an employee, even while the employee is not acting
within the scope of his or her employment, in order to ensure that
other employees are not harmed.75 The court went so far as to hold
that “[n]o privacy interest of the employee stands in the way of this
duty on the part of the employer.”76
Thus, companies engage in surveillance for various reasons
ranging from legal compliance and liability, to security concerns.77
Whether the company engages in monitoring to protect the
company itself or its protected proprietary information, companies
employ various modes and methods of monitoring their
employees’ electronic actions taking place on the company
computer network. Although the employer’s justification may be
clear as to why, where, when and how monitoring should take
place, the sheer act of monitoring itself still continues to raise
questions of fairness and privacy, and in essence forces employers
to serve two masters—the interests of the company and the
interests of its employees.

72

Id. at 167-68. See also Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 2005).
73
Wen, supra note 2, at 168.
74
Id.
75
Doe, 887 A.2d at 1168.
76
Id.
77
AMA RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 1.
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B. Monitoring—Serving Two Masters
Businesses monitor while serving two masters—the company
itself, and its employees.78 Monitoring protects the corporation by
ensuring employee productivity and the security of proprietary
information.79 However, monitoring creates the perception of a
diminished sense of employee trust because of jeopardized
employee privacy.80 When monitoring takes place, two needs must
be reconciled—the need to protect company information and
resources while maintaining employee morale and trust.81
Almost twenty years ago, the federal government recognized
the growing need to study the amount of workplace surveillance,
and as a result, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
published The Electronic Supervisor.82 This book forecasted the
effects of workplace supervision in the face of the increasing use
of technology.83 Even twenty years ago, the federal government
acknowledged that by monitoring employees, questions will be
raised relating to technology and its effects on “privacy, civil
liberties, and quality of working life.”84
Privacy in the workplace is the “right to be left alone and to not

78

John J. Sheridan, Minimizing the Risk of Security Threats to Proprietary
Information, 29 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS TODAY 41 (2003). Sheridan argues
that
a company’s true competitive advantage lies in its people. Whether
they are customer service representatives . . . or CEOs, people make
things happen. But in order to elicit the best work there must be a free
exchange of information . . . [which] . . . can be accomplished only if
there is an established trust that proprietary information will remain
confidential.
Id. at 41.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See id.
82
U.S. Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ELECTRONIC
SUPERVISOR: NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW TENSIONS (U.S. Government Printing
Office 1987).
83
Id. at 1.
84
Id.
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be intruded upon.”85 However, the OTA noted that electronic
monitoring creates in employees a constant feeling of “being
watched” different from the temporary reactions generated when a
supervisor is monitoring in person.86 Workers who are continually
monitored report feelings of paranoia and increased negative health
side effects.87 Companies that constantly monitor their employees
destroy the innate sense of trust and cooperation that keeps a
company and its employees together.88 Studies have shown that
monitoring in the workplace can cause stress-related illnesses and
negative psychological effects.89 Specifically, employees who are
monitored describe a decline in workplace productivity and morale
caused from increased occupational health problems, tension and
anxiety.90 These problems ultimately result in increased operating
costs for the company and lower workforce productivity.91
Even though companies are aware of surveillance’s negative
effects, they still continue to monitor in order to protect the
company. An example of the severe effects of computer
surveillance and its repercussions took place at the New York
Times in 2001.92 After an employee complained of receiving an
85

Id. at 8.
Id.
87
Hazel Oliver, Email and Internet Monitoring in the Workplace:
Information Privacy and Contracting-Out, 31 INDUS. L.J. 321 (2002). In 1993,
the American Civil Liberties Union reported that workplace stress costs
American companies almost $50 billion per year in increased health costs and
lost productivity. 139 CONG. REC. S6122, S6123. (daily ed., May 19, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Simon).
88
Jared D. Beeson, Cyberprivacy on the Corporate Intranet: Does the Law
Allow Private-Sector Employers to Read Their Employee’s E-Mail?, 20 U.
HAW. L. REV. 165, 167 n.18 (1998).
89
Oliver, supra note 87, at 32.
90
Beeson, supra note 88, at 167 n.18.
91
See generally id.
92
James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Hard Drive, 4 GREEN BAG 2d
169 (2001). However, most companies report that the total number of
investigations that actually take place, as compared to the total number of
employees with access to the Internet, computer files, or emails, is rather small.
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: COMPUTER-USE MONITORING AND
POLICIES OF SELECTED COMPANIES 8 (2002).
86
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offensive e-mail, the Times, without notice to its employees,
proceeded to scan every computer and its contents within the
corporate office.93 The search revealed items ranging from
tasteless jokes to pornography.94 As a result, almost 10% of New
York Times employees of one particular department were
summarily terminated while others were reprimanded and
warned.95 Nonetheless, in spite of all of these negative
consequences and plausible fair reasoning behind electronic
monitoring, employers still monitor under the charge, “You can—
and should—monitor.”96
The evidence is clear: monitoring is a necessary corporate tool
to protect the corporation.97 However, compelling facts show that
the act of monitoring is not protecting employees, but is rather
hurting them physically, psychologically, and socially.98 Yet,
surveillance can be tempered, and indeed serve the needs of both
the company and the employee, through the utilization of
agreements which clearly set out the guidelines and expectations of
both parties.
C. Acceptable Computer/Network Use Policies
Employers have recognized the sheer amount of inherent risk
involved with computers in the workplace.99 Thus, employers have
begun to institute Acceptable Use Policies (AUP), which set forth
93

Rosenbaum, supra note 92, at 170.
Id.
95
Id. Similar occurrences happened at Dow Chemical and Xerox. In 1999,
Xerox fired more than 40 employees for viewing pornographic websites for
almost eight hours a day. William G. Porter & Michael C. Griffaton, Between
the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Monitoring the Electronic Workplace, 70 DEF.
COUNS. J. 65, 76 (2003). In 2000, Dow Chemical fired 74 employees, including
executives, and punished 435 others for distributing and viewing sexually
explicit and violent materials via company e-mail. Rosenbaum, supra note 92, at
170.
96
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, You & the Law:
Quick, Easy-to-Use Advise on Employment 2 (2002).
97
See supra Part II.A.
98
Oliver, supra note 87.
99
See supra Part II.A.
94
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permissible and prohibited computer, network, and Internet
usage.100 An AUP is an agreement signed by employee and
employer which contains guidelines of how an employee can
access and use the employer’s computer system.101 AUPs also set
forth appropriate computer behavior,102 use,103 and governance
responsibilities of both management and employees.104 AUPs are
designed to protect both the employer and employee because they
prevent an employee from claiming a privacy violation by clearly
stating the expectations and responsibilities.105 Employees are
explicitly aware of their expected computer use behavior, while
these policies reaffirm the employer’s right to monitor the
employee’s use of company computers by explaining acceptable
computer use, and placing employees on notice of the penalties for
misuse.106 In essence, by instituting usage guidelines, supervisors
inform their employees of what conduct is approved and forbidden
on the corporate computer network.107 In general, an AUP should
explain what type of data will be monitored, why surveillance is
necessary, and how and when the surveillance will take place.108
Furthermore, the policy should clearly inform employees of what
the repercussions will be if they break the rules.109 Also, it should
100

FPMI COMMUNICATIONS, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: MANAGING
CYBERSPACE IN THE WORKPLACE (2000).
101
Id. at 149. The policy usually includes the requirements for user’s logon
information and its maintenance. See supra note 9, for further discussion
concerning a user’s logon information.
102
SCOTT BARRMAN, WRITING INFORMATION SECURITY POLICIES 150
(2002).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 150-53.
105
Id at 48.
106
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 9.
107
BARRMAN, supra note 102, at 150.
108
Id. at 152.
109
Porter, supra note 95, at 75. Some sample provisions that might be
included in an AUP under use guidelines are as follows:
(1) Systems and network are to be used for business purposes only.
Incidental personal use is permitted as long as it is not more than a
trivial amount of time and does not interfere with your tasks.
(2) Users may not use the systems, network, or Internet connection to
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be noted that like other contracts which are unfairly slanted toward
the person or corporation writing the contract, if an AUP does not
contain the employer’s responsibilities as a part of fair bargain,
courts will invalidate it as unfair.110
The use of AUPs is now common and widespread and in 2002,
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) addressed the
almost ubiquitous use of AUPs by filing a report with the House of
Representatives Committee on Education and the Workforce’s
Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness.111 The report
focuses on how the wide discretion private employers have in their
ability to monitor what their employees are doing on the computer
network impacts the workplace.112 Private employers enjoy overly
broad discretion because of the wide variance in federal and state
laws, as well as differing judicial decisions.113 The GAO surveyed
fourteen Fortune 1000 private sector companies spanning five
different industries.114 The survey found that all of the companies
play games.
(3) Users are reminded that organizational information is proprietary
and may not be shared with any outsider.
(4) Users are reminded that Internet connections are not private. While
online, users must be careful as to what they disclose to others. Users
should refrain from sending out any information that may be damaging
to the organization or themselves.
Id. at 150-51.
110
BARRMAN, supra note 102, at 151.
111
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92.
112
Id. at 1.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 2. The GAO surveyed fourteen companies from the financial
services, general services, manufacturing, professional services, and
wholesale/retail industries, involving interviews with representatives from the
general counsel’s office, human resource departments, as well as internal audit
and computer security administrators. Id. These administrators further reported
that a successful AUP depends on its successful implementation. The following
list, selections from, the Ten Commandments for Avoiding Workplace Exposure, has become the standard-bearer of what steps should be taken to secure
the successful implementation of an AUP:
1) Publish policies regarding employee use of e-mail, the Internet,
instant messaging and any employer issued hardware or software . . . .
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had some form of AUP that informed employees that there is no
expectation of privacy while using the corporate computer
network.115 Experts agree that employers should notify employees
of the organization’s responsibilities and disclose what will be

2) Secure employee acknowledgement of each of these policies in
writing or electronically at hire or promulgation and preferably reexecute or bring to employees’ attention on a regular periodic basis.
3) Inform all employees of the employer’s explicit intention to monitor
e-mail, Internet use and any other use of employer issued computers
and electronic devices as deemed necessary for business purposes.
Include the right to inspect any hardware issued to employees. Be sure
to update the list of hardware items.
4) Train all employees on how to write appropriate business e-mails.
Evidence suggests that you cannot assume that even high-ranking
officials know how to use e-mail appropriately in a business
setting . . . .
....
6) Create a written document retention policy that includes monthly or
semi-monthly deletion of e-mails. Include a policy of recycling backup
tapes. Be sure that any document retention policy complies with
any . . . legislation or [court] rulings . . . .
7) Inform all employees of your intention to turn over any evidence of
possible legal wrongdoing to the authorities. Also stress that you will
cooperate with law enforcement officials seeking evidence of illegal
activity, including evidence of terrorist related activities.
8) Be sure to enforce all policies. Do so in an even-handed manner that
treats employees of all levels similarly. Note any exceptions to the
policy.
9) Keep current on new technology in the market place. Assess how
new software, hardware or innovations in devices issued to or owned
by employees may be affecting the workplace.
10) Re-evaluate all technology-related policies annually, adjust them as
necessary and inform employees of any changes and secure their
affirmative consent to any important change.
Morris Jr., supra note 63, at 913.
115
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 10. The GAO continued to
report that “courts have consistently upheld companies’ monitoring practices
where the company has a stated policy that employees have no expectation of
privacy on company computer systems.” Id.

JACOBS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC

PENUMBRAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

857

monitored, while making clear that no expectation of privacy exists
while using a company computer.116 In the face of the amount of
monitoring that takes place and the lack of statutory guidance,
Congress and varied state legislatures have begun to make strides
at providing business with limitations and procedures as to how
and when monitoring can take place in the workplace which
together with an employee’s right of privacy and security of
documents lead to an ultimate right of property.
III. WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE STATUTES
In response to increasing workplace surveillance, attempts have
recently been made to ensure a worker’s right to privacy in the
workplace.117 However, a dichotomy exists within the current
law.118 Both federal and state law grant a modicum of privacy
rights to public employees over their work and communications.119
Unfortunately, because no federal law exists to provide employees
and employers in the private sector with uniform standards
concerning the ownership of electronic documents, companies
must rely on piecemeal state statutes which vary from state to state,
if they exist at all. As a result the private sector utilizes
employment procedures, manuals, and privacy agreements to
preserve an employee’s privacy and the employer’s work
116

BARRMAN, supra note 102, at 150. The GAO observed that:
Some companies directly inform employees that they should under no
circumstances expect privacy. For example, once policy stated, “All
users should understand that there is not right or reasonable expectation
of privacy in any e-mail messages on the company’s system.”
Somewhat less explicit, another policy stated, “Our personal privacy is
not protected on these systems, and we shouldn’t expect it to be.” Some
companies generally implied the principle of “no expectation of
privacy” with statements like, “[company] reserves the right to audit,
access, and inspect electronic communications and data stored or
transmitted on its Computer Resources.
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 12.
117
See Wen, supra note 2, at 166.
118
See infra Part III.A-B.
119
See infra Part III.A-B.
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product.120 The current state of the law regarding employee
surveillance is “an amalgam of legislation, federal and state, that
resonates against a body of state common law governing individual
dignitary interests—the torts of defamation, infliction of emotional
distress, and invasion of privacy—the content of which can vary
considerably from state to state.”121
A. State Statutes
Reacting to the possibility that computer surveillance will
allow employers to exploit their employees’ privacy,122 state
legislatures have begun to address the issue that as the use of more
sophisticated technology in the workplace increases, so does the
risk of employer abuse.123 Although states have previously passed
legislation to protect individuals and corporations from computer
crimes such as identity theft and hacking,124 the past three years
have seen a watershed movement for states to attempt to protect
the electronic communications, and thereby the privacy, of private
120

See infra Part III.B.
Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy:
The United State Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 472 (2002).
122
See generally Harvard Law Review Association, Addressing the New
Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898 (1991)
(forecasting that although federal and state legislatures have addressed computer
crime, in 1991, there was a lack of protection for employees from employer
abuse of privacy rights infringement).
123
Id. at 1899. States across the nation have made various attempts to pass
legislation to protect employees. In 1997, the Georgia Assembly proposed the
Georgia Privacy for Consumers Workers Act, which would have required
employers to notify employees when and why workplace surveillance was
taking place. HB 566 Ga. 1997 (proposed in 1997) (as of the date of publication,
this bill was not carryovered from the 1997 session). In 2001, The California
Legislature, submitted for a third time to Governor Gray Davis, a law which
would have required employers to give employees notice of electronic
monitoring. See Wen, supra note 2, at 170. The Massachusetts Senate in 2005,
proposed the Communication and Information Privacy Act which would have
also required employers to notify employees when they are being monitored.
2005 Mass. S.D. 1117 (proposed Jan 05) (as of the date of publication, this bill
is still in Mass. Senate Committee).
124
See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122.
121
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citizens in the workplace.125 Recently, states such as Florida,
Connecticut, and Delaware have taken steps to protect workers’
privacy by enacting various statutes.126 Although each statute was
designed to protect consumers and businesses from electronic
communications fraud, or individuals from wiretapping, each state
also included employee protections from secret monitoring by their
employers.127
In 1978, Florida led the nation by becoming the first state to
pass statutes that allowed corporations and businesses to seek a
legal remedy for acts of computer crime.128 In doing so, the Florida
Legislature took the first steps toward protecting an employee’s
electronic communication at work; that protection was finally
secured in 2003 when the Florida Legislature passed the Security
of Communications Act.129 Under the statute, it is a felony to
“intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept . . . any wire, oral,
or electronic communications.”130 However, interception is
allowed if it takes place during the normal course of employment,
while engaged in any activity that is a necessary incident to the
rendition of his or her service, such as in the service of police
investigatory work.131 Therefore, in Florida, if an employer
electronically monitors its employees, the interception of any email
or Internet usage must take place in the normal course of business
and be done in order to secure the employer’s property rights.132
125

See infra notes 129-141 for a further discussion.
See infra notes 129-141 for a further discussion.
127
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(1) (2003) and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
31-48d (2005).
128
See Florida Computer Crimes Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.01-.07 (1976
& Supp. 1991).
129
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(1) (2003).
130
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.03(1)(a) (2003).
131
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.03(1)(e)-(g)(2003). Although statutes exist on
both the federal and state level that prevent wiretapping, this section of this
statue specifically protects communications in the private workplace. Id.
132
Wen, supra note 2, at 170. Further, it should be noted that in Florida, an
employer would be able to employ the monitoring tools discussed earlier, see
supra Part III.A, to protect against the theft of proprietary information or suit
liability, for instance from sexual harassment. Otherwise, under Florida statute,
an employer has no right to monitor the work of his employees without the
126
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Following Florida’s lead, in 2001, Delaware passed a statute
requiring all employers, both public and private, to notify their
employees of monitoring.133 Under this provision, “no
employer . . . shall monitor or otherwise intercept any telephone
conversation or transmission, electronic mail or transmission, or
Internet access or usage . . . unless the employer has provided
some form of notice to the employee.”134 Notice is effectuated by
either (1) providing an electronic notice of monitoring to an
employee at least once a day when the employee accesses
electronic resources, or (2) giving the employee a one-time written
notice concerning the scope and types of monitoring.135 The
written notice must be maintained and securely kept by the
company and both the employee and supervisor must consent.136
In 2003, Connecticut passed the Communications Technology
in the Workplace Act.137 Connecticut’s statute only permits the
gathering of information detailing an employee’s activities through
direct observation.138 Employers are defined as any business that
operates within the state—both public and private.139 However, if
an employer provides written notice to an employee of all forms of
monitoring, both through direct and electronic surveillance that is
taking place, and posts notice in a conspicuous place, monitoring is
allowed.140
B. Federal Statutes
The federal government has done little lately to protect the
rights of individuals from secret electronic monitoring. The

written consent of all parties engaged in the monitoring—both employee and
supervisors. Wen, supra note 2, at 170.
133
19 DEL. C. § 705 (2005).
134
19 DEL. C. § 705(b) (2005).
135
Id.
136
19 DEL. C. § 705(b)(1)(2) (2005).
137
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (2005).
138
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(a)(3) (2005).
139
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(a)(1) (2005).
140
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2005).
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986141 (ECPA) stands
as the controlling legislation that “prohibits the interception,
disclosure, or use of wire, oral or electronic communication.”142
Congress twice attempted to pass more comprehensive and
protective pieces of legislation: in 1990 the Privacy for Consumers
and Workers Act143 (PCWA) and in 2000 the Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act144 (NEMA). However, both of these Congressional
attempts have failed,145 and to date, only the twenty-year-old
ECPA provides protections to employees who are being
monitored.146
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act147
Fifteen years ago, the Harvard Law Review Association argued
that laws designed to protect individuals and companies from
computer crimes were not enough to protect employees from abuse
by their employers148—specifically referring to the Electronic
Communications Act of 1986.149 Harvard raised the following
“age-old workplace” conflict in light of the ECPA—”how much
access employers should have to their employees’ workspace, and
how much freedom employees should have to use workplace
141

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508
(1986), 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter ECPA].
142
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, Privacy Under Siege: Electronic
Monitoring in the Workplace 14 (2005), available at http://www.workrights.
org/issue_electronic/NWI_EM_Report.pdf.
143
Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act of 1990, H.R. 2168 (1st Sess.
1990).
144
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess.
2000).
145
See infra Part III.B.1-3.
146
See infra Part III.B.1.
147
ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986).
148
See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122, at 1899.
149
ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), 100 Stat. 1848. The Act was
originally passed into law as an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1986. NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at
14
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resources for their own purposes.”150 The ECPA prohibits the
“interception and disclosure of wire, oral or electronic
communication, with certain exceptions.”151 The protections
afforded by the ECPA apply to all businesses involved in interstate
commerce.152
The Act as originally passed in 1986 deals only with the
electronics, technology and circumstances contemporary to its
time. The main focus and purpose of this law is to protect
businesses and corporations from computer crime and individuals
from wiretapping.153 This focus is biased in favor of the employer,
and the only remedy given to employees is the common law tort of
invasion of privacy.154 However, proving the tort of invasion of
privacy is a difficult task to undertake because an employee has to
first show that the company’s interception of his or her
communication could not be excused as a legitimate business
practice.155 Then the employee has to prove that his or her
communication was never intended to be distributed to the public,
let alone to his or her employer.156 Furthermore, the employee
must demonstrate that a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
communication existed.157
2. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act158
In 1990, Senator Paul Simon and Representative Pat Williams
introduced the PWCA, respectively, in the United States Senate
and House of Representatives.159 From 1990 to 1993, Sen. Simon,
150

Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122, at 1911.
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 14.
152
Id. at 14.
153
See ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), 100 Stat. 1848.
154
Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122, at 1911.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. However, public sector employees are virtually barred from claiming
Fourth Amendment violations because it is nearly impossible to prove the
elements of privacy and reasonableness. Id.
158
H.R. 2168 (1st Sess. 1990).
159
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19.
151
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Rep. Williams, and over 150 bipartisan cosponsors continued to
reintroduce the bill after each failed attempt to bring the bill out of
committee and onto the floor for a full vote in each respective
chamber.160 The PCWA would have provided employees with a
“right to know” when and where monitoring would take place and
mandated advanced notice of what would be collected and how it
would be used.161 Sen. Simon characterized the unrestrained
surveillance of workers as turning the “modern office into [an]
electronic sweatshop.”162
The PCWA would have required employers to allow their
workers to have unfettered access to the data that was collected
through workplace surveillance.163 Under this law, employers
would have to set out their policies and inform prospective
employees of their monitoring practices.164 Furthermore, the
PCWA would have prohibited companies from storing, gathering,
utilizing, or distributing data obtained by electronic surveillance.165
It would also require that employers inform their employees when
monitoring is actually taking place through a signal light, beeping
tone, verbal notification, or other forms of notification.166 A crucial
issue in the PCWA was that an employee would never be able to
waive his or her First Amendment rights.167 If an employer were to
enter into a private agreement concerning approved computer
network usage, that agreement could never take away his or her
protected constitutional right of freedom of expression.168
When the proposed legislation was first debated in committee,
Senator Simon characterized employee monitoring as an
160
161

Id.
139 CONG. REC. S2430 (daily ed., Feb. 6, 1991) (statement of Sen.

Simon).
162

Id.
H.R. 2168 (1st Sess. 1990).
164
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19.
165
H.R. 2168 (1st Sess. 1990).
166
137 CONG. REC. E709 (daily ed., March 1, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Williams).
167
Id.
168
See id. (stating that the act “prohibits the waiver of rights and
procedures provided by this act.”).
163
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“electronic whip that drives the fast pace of today’s workplace.”169
He stated, that “it is an unfortunate irony that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation is required to obtain a court order to wiretap a
telephone, even in cases of national security, but that employers
are permitted to spy at will on their own personnel and the
public.”170 He also noted at the time, that the United States and
South Africa were the only countries that failed to have some of
protections that safeguarded an employee’s privacy in the
workplace.171 At the time, the PCWA’s opponents were
successfully able to argue the PCWA’s impracticality and
ineffectiveness in face of tort law and other remedies.172 During
the PCWA’s final debate, Sen. Simon prophesized that:
Just over the horizon are more technology
breakthroughs and refinements that we can’t even envision
today. Unless we begin now to define privacy—and in
particular workplace privacy—as a value worth protecting,
these new technologies will be upon us before we are ready
for them. Weighing these issues will allow us to be the
masters of technology, instead of its slaves.173
169

139 CONG. REC. S6122 (daily ed., May 19, 1993) (statement of Sen.

Simon).
170

137 CONG. REC. S2430 (daily ed., Feb. 6, 1991) (statement of Sen.

Simon).
171

Id. Also the International Labour Organization (ILO), adopted The ILO
Code: The Standard for Workers’ Rights, a basic set of employee protections
which include:
Coverage for both public and private sector employees; That employees
should have notice of data collection processes; That data should be
collected and used lawfully and fairly . . . That data should be used for
reasons directly relevant to employment . . . That data should be held
securely; That workers should have access to data . . . That workers
cannot waive their privacy rights . . . .
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, Workplace Privacy, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/workplace.
172
Kristen B. DeTienne, The Boss’s Eyes and Ears: A Case Study of
Electronic Employee Monitoring and the Privacy for Consumers and Workers
Act, 12 LAB. LAW. 93, 98 (1996).
173
139 CONG. REC. S6122, S6123 (daily ed., May 19, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Simon).
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At the end of the 1993 Congressional term, the PCWA died in
committee in both houses and has yet to be introduced.174
3. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act175
Ten years after the failed attempt to pass the PWCA, Senator
Charles Schumer and Representative Charles Candy introduced the
NEMA in 2000.176 This bill also failed to receive a vote on the
floors of both houses of Congress.177 Under NEMA, any
“employer who intentionally, by any electronic means, reads,
listens to, or otherwise monitors any wire communication, oral
communication, or electronic communication of an employee,
without first having provided the employee notice . . . shall be
liable to the employee for relief.”178 The notice requirement would
be satisfied so long as the employer told the employees which
communications or computer uses would be monitored, how the
monitoring would take place, and how the information obtained
would be maintained.179 Furthermore, employers would be
required to disclose the monitoring and collection of “non-work
related information.”180 This provision would have also allowed
employees to seek damages in federal courts for violations.181
Specifically, employers would be liable for attorney’s fees,
punitive and actual damages, and other costs, with the total not
exceeding $500,000, should the employee be successful in a
lawsuit against the employer for a NEMA violation.182
Both federal and state governments have begun to make strides
in limiting how, when, and why monitoring takes places. The
actual notice of when and where monitoring takes place as
afforded by some states, is a first step in affording workers
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19.
H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000).
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19.
See H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000).
Id. at 277(a)(1).
See id.
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19.
Id.
Id.
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adequate protections at work, yet still does nothing to help
determine property rights over personal electronic documents
created or maintained on a corporate computer network. However,
until a unified national policy is in place, states will attempt to fill
in the gap, and in the absence of no legislation, companies alone
are left to set their own individual surveillance policies. Just as
guidance exists for the federal government and its employees,
some form of unifying policy must come into existence.
IV. AN EXAMPLE WITHIN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: HAYNES V. OFFICE
183
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Government employees maintain a privacy right over their
personal belongings at the workplace.184 When analyzing
government employees’ privacy rights, courts engage in a Fourth
Amendment analysis.185 However, this Fourth Amendment
analysis only applies to public sector employees.186 Private sector
employees can not claim Fourth Amendment violations when their
private employers seize their electronic documents.187
O’Connor v. Ortega188 provides the groundwork for analyzing
a government employee’s inherent privacy and property rights over
his or her computer and contents when juxtaposed against classical
Fourth Amendment analyses. Under O’Connor, employees in the
government sector may gain a full expectation of privacy over their
work, if similar expectations of privacy existed when the document
was first created.189 The expectation of privacy is even further
bolstered if the document is stored under conditions where access
is granted only to selected users.190
The O’Connor framework begins with the Fourth Amendment,
which guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in the
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

2005 WL 2704956 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2005).
Id.
See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
See e.g. id.
See e.g. id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”191 A Fourth Amendment violation is established
when a “legitimate expectation of privacy”192 exists. To determine
if a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, a two-part inquiry
must take place, which requires: (1) a showing of a subjective
expectation of privacy in the area searched, and (2) an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.193
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that governmental
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but this
expectation may be reduced by what takes place in the office
place.194 However, resolving whether or not an expectation of
privacy exists remains a fact specific problem which must be
viewed in a reasonable light concerning all of the surrounding
circumstances of a specific case.195
An important aspect in determining whether or not an
expectation of privacy exists involves the use and maintenance of
computer passwords,196 as well as the general security of an
employee’s workspace.197 U.S. v. Slanina held that when public
agencies mandate that their employees use passwords to secure
their computers and keys to secure their offices, those actions may
be evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy.198 Further,
when employers fail to notify employees that their computer use
can be monitored, in conjunction with the absence of evidence that

191

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
193
U.S. v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). Further, as with the expectation of privacy in
one’s home, such an expectation in one’s place of work is “based upon societal
expectations that have deep roots in the history of the [Fourth] Amendment.”
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n. 8 (1984).
194
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716-17. The expectation of privacy may be
limited by such things as office practices and procedures, or by legitimate
regulation. Id.
195
Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General Phill Kline, 298 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1161 (D. Kan. 2003).
196
See supra note 15, for a further discussion concerning passwords.
197
U.S. v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 2002).
198
Id.
192
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other employees can access each other’s computers,199 the
employees’ subjective expectation of privacy can rise to an
objective level of privacy or one that society is prepared to
recognize.200
In Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General, Carlus Haynes, a
former Kansas Assistant Attorney General, sought injunctive relief
to prevent his former employer, the Kansas Attorney General, from
accessing his private files on his work computer as well as
damages.201 Prior to Haynes’ termination he was denied access to
both personal and work related files which were stored on his
computer.202 The Haynes court relied on the O’Connor framework
to determine if an expectation of privacy existed.203 Haynes alleged
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information stored on his
work computer, and that the search following his termination
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.204 Further, Haynes claimed
a property interest in the personal information stored on his work
computer and that the state’s actions in preventing him from
accessing his personal information deprived “him of property
199

With any computer network, system administrators may have access to
even password-protected data; however, when this administrator access is not
routine it only further bolsters an employee’s expectation of privacy. See
generally id. at 676-77.
200
Id.
201
Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956 1. (D. Kan.
Aug. 26, 2005).
202
Id. The facts surrounding Haynes’ termination and subsequent denial of
access are as follows: Haynes was informed that he was going to be fired in two
weeks. On the same day, Haynes’ supervisor contacted a computer specialist to
restrict Haynes’ computer access to certain times and to ensure that no data was
copied. When Haynes accessed his computer and began to copy his personal
files and work product he was approached by his supervisor and accused of
stealing. Haynes explained that he was copying his personal files. About an hour
later, Haynes was summarily terminated, given fifteen minutes to leave and was
not allowed to take anything with him, including personal items. After his
termination, certain files on his computer, including personal e-mail messages,
were viewed by other employees of the Kansas Attorney General. However,
after several months had passed, Haynes was given access to all of his e-mail
and documents that remained on his computer. Id.
203
Id. at 3.
204
Id. at 1.
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without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”205
The court focused mainly on whether or not Haynes’
expectation of privacy was indeed reasonable. When Haynes’
employment began, he signed the Kansas Attorney General’s
Office’s Computer Use Procedures,206 which set forth the system’s
privacy expectations.207 Each time Haynes logged onto his
computer he was presented with an explicit warning208 informing
205

Id. The Haynes court relied on United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d
1130 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845 (2002), to reach its decision. In
Angevine, the defendant, an “Oklahoma State University professor, had been
prosecuted for possession of child pornography . . . [and] sought to suppress the
pornography that had been seized.” Haynes, 2005 WL 2704956 at 2. In this
instance the defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy because of the following: “(1) the university’s policy that allowed the
university to audit and monitor Internet use and warned that information flowing
through the university network was not confidential; (2) the university owned
the computer and explicitly reserved ownership of data stored within.” Id.
206
Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956, 2 (D. Kan.
Aug. 26, 2005). The full policy read as follows:
Office computer use shall be in compliance with computer use
procedures. Obtain full procedures from your deputy or supervisor.
Computer use for non-official business is authorized only if kept to
minimum duration & frequency & if it does not interfere with state
business. This system shall not be used unlawfully nor for any purpose
which could embarrass the user, recipient or Attorney General. There
shall be no expectation of privacy in using this system; however,
intentional access to another user’s e-mail without permission shall be
prohibited, except as authorized by computer use procedures. Despite
deletion, files may remain available in storage. Personal data on the
system may be subject to removal. Data may be subject to state public
records and records preservation laws. User software installation is
prohibited unless specifically authorized. Software may not be copied
for use outside this office unless authorized.
Id.
207

Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956, 2 (D. Kan.
Aug. 26, 2005).
208
Id. at 4. Warning messages reminding employees of the pre-existing
AUP, have played a significant role in court decisions. See United States v.
Simons, 206 F. 3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a CIA division’s Internet
usage policy eliminated a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning file
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him and all employees that computer use was not confidential, that
there was no expectation of privacy, and that personal files stored
on the network could be removed at any time, without notice.209
Despite Haynes’ password and private workspace, the warning
conveyed to Haynes each time he used his computer was the
overwhelming factor in the court’s decision to deny the
injunction.210 Ultimately, the court found that Haynes did not
sufficiently demonstrate an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy.211 However, the court did note that the law concerning the
expectation of privacy is in a state of “flux with the outcome
heavily dependent upon the particular facts of each case.”212
Even government employees, as exemplified by the Haynes
decision, have a difficult task of asserting privacy and property
rights over their electronic documents. Fourth Amendment
protections and its afforded heightened level of security, seems to
do little when companies utilize AUPs and notification procedures.
Nonetheless, even against a uniform standard of determining how,
when, and where a right of privacy exists finding a property right
is an intricate determination to make—for both public and private
employees.
V. THE SHMUELI DECISION AND THE FUTURE
The division between business and personal documents must
transfers, all websites history, and all e-mail); Muick v. Glenayre Electronics,
280 F. 3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002) (ruling that an employee has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in laptop files where employer announced it could inspect
laptops it provides to employees); United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822
(D. Neb. 2003) (finding that an employee has no reasonable basis to believe
activities on work computer were private “when, through company’s screen
notification, they have actual knowledge that the computer can be searched”);
United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (holding that a sergeant
has no reasonable expectation of privacy over his government e-mail account
because use was reserved for official business and network banner informed
users upon login that use was subject to monitoring).
209
Haynes, 2005 WL 2704956 at 4.
210
Id. at 2.
211
Id. at 4.
212
Id.
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have a clear distinction or both employers and employees will
suffer significant costs after the employment relationship is
severed. It is well established that employers electronically
monitor their employees’ communication. Protections afforded by
statutes, and notifications provided by AUPs which detail an
employee’s minimal expectation of privacy, are nominal steps
toward identifying who maintains property rights over personal
electronic documents created or maintained on a work computer.
Current protections afforded by statutes and AUPs are designed to
ensure the security of proprietary information and employee
productivity,213 as well as the security of electronic
communications.214 AUPs and current statutes, however, never
assign property right protections. Just as an electronic
communication can be stolen through wiretapping, an electronic
document can be illegally taken through various surveillance and
monitoring techniques.215
Although electronic documents are not communications, they
are capable of being viewed, copied, and maliciously stolen though
electronic monitoring. As one journalist observed,
[t]he commingling of personal and business property on
company computers [continues to grow] . . . [f]rom
personal e-mail to screenplays written on the lunch hour,
employers should anticipate the obligation to identify . . .
and return personal data ‘belonging’ to fired employees.
Likewise, employees need to tailor . . . personal use of
company systems to the possibility of lock out.216
All employees have notions that after they are fired they will be
given a cardboard box to collect their personal belongings before
their final exit. As the issue of electronic property further develops,
or as employers seek to avoid litigation, society must decide if it
wants to grant former employees “computer visitation rights,”
213

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
215
See supra Part II.A, which describes the surveillance monitoring
techniques that take place that give employers the opportunity to take an
employee’s electronic document.
216
Craig Ball, Yours, Mine and Ouch!, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Sep.
2005, available at http://www.craigball.com/BIYC04-092005.pdf
214
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which would allow employees a window of opportunity to access
their computers after they have been terminated.217 When choosing
to grant visitation rights, certain limitations must be considered.
For example, if former employees are allowed to “visit” their old
computers, the company may run the risk of loosing proprietary
information because the former employee now works for a
competing firm.218 Conversely, in a scenario where the former
employer will actually give former employees their personal
electronic documents, employees must ask if they want their old
employer going through their former computer, sifting personal
from work product.219
Legislation and case law currently guide employees and
employers as to the particulars of copyright, trademark or patent
infringement, or the theft of trade secrets.220 Further, restrictive
covenants and acceptable use policies entered into between
employers and employees can affect the property relationship.221
Nonetheless, if an employee were to use the company’s computer
for personal matters, such as writing a novel, during a non-paid
lunch hour, no guidance beyond the likely employer-slanted AUP
exists to protect the employee’s property rights over his or her
personal material.222 Under Shmueli, if an employer was to
unlawfully take an independent contractor’s personal printed
document, conversion applies.223 This same remedy does not
apply to electronic documents because no statutory protections are
provided for the benefit of the privately employed worker.224 To
217

Id.
Id.
219
Id.
220
Trade secret protection is extended to “any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it.” Ashland Mgt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.S.2d 912, 918 (Sup. Ct. 1993)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 757, comment b (1993)). Patent,
trademark, and copyright protection will not be discussed in this Note.
221
See supra Part II.C.
222
See supra Part II.C.
223
Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
224
See supra Part III.
218
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avoid the possible usurpation of employee property rights, some
legal experts contend that laws should be passed which limit the
conditions and circumstances of monitoring and thereby protect
private sector employees’ property interest over their electronic
documents.225
In order to avoid lawsuits by former employees over the
property interests in the employees’ personal electronic documents,
it would benefit employers to follow a set policy that allows both
employers and employees to maintain control over the documents
that rightfully belong to each respective party. Although a policy
may exist which assigns property rights, this policy still does not
resolve the problem presented by Shmueli, which provides no
direction for employees who have had their personal electronic
documents taken by their employers.
Similar to the problems Sarit Shmueli faced when her private
files were taken by her employer, employees who are denied
access to documents stored on their computers have few remedies.
Furthermore, because an employer can monitor, see, and even copy
what an employee does on his or her company computer,226 an
employee has essentially no avenues of redress when personal files
stored on the company computer have been copied, taken,
monitored or logged without the employee’s knowledge or
consent.
VI. DOES THE ANSWER REST IN PRIVACY? STATUTORY
PROTECTION? OR BOTH?
A middle line must be drawn which protects business interests
as well as personal privacy and property rights. As more and more
people rely on computers to perform their work tasks, society faces
a conundrum—whether or not to extend privacy rights into the
realm of the work computer. Congressional legislative history227 as
well as strides made at the state level,228 have recognized a desire
225
226
227
228

U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 1.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
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to extend a level of privacy onto an employee’s work computer.
This privacy interest must be defined in a consistent national
policy that will guide both employers and employees. Reasoningby-interpolation, or penumbral reasoning, provides one possible
answer to the problem. In balancing a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the workplace229 against the need for monitoring,230 any
real solution must confront the following paradox:
If an employee knows that his employer engages in
electronic eavesdropping, he has no subjective expectation
of privacy because he knows that his employer can
intercept every word he utters. Thus, by notifying
employees that eavesdropping is taking place, employers
can effectively negate employees’ claims to privacy in the
workplace under the traditional justifiable-expectation-ofprivacy analysis.231
Currently, when the two needs are pitted against one another, an
employee’s expectation of privacy is destroyed in favor of the
company’s need to monitor. A solution must be found which
preserves both interests.
Penumbral reasoning is the “drawing of logical inferences by
looking at relevant parts of the Constitution as a whole and their
relationship to one another.”232 Although the analogy is not direct,
it does provide a basis for interpolation. When an employee’s
security right over his or her communications and his or her to
right privacy in the workplace are placed against one another, as
this Note proposes, in the overlap a property right over electronic
229

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.A.
231
Jonathan J. Green, Electronic Monitoring In the Workplace: The Need
For Standards, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 438, 445 (1984).
232
Denning, supra note 8, at 1092.
In most judges’ and scholars’ minds, the premier contemporary
example of penumbral reasoning is Griswold. In Griswold, Justice
Douglas looked at various provisions of the Bill of Rights, include
those that protect assembly, freedom from self-incrimination . . .
From this survey, he inferred that there was a common thread
throughout that government could not intrude into the privacy of
individuals absent fairly compelling circumstances.
Id.
230
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documents is generated.
Current statutory protections, both at the state and federal
levels, grant public and private employees security over their
electronic communications.233 Case law provides the proposition
that an expectation of privacy exists at work.234 Furthermore,
corporate practices support and recognize this notion as well
through their use of blanket statements235 utilized in AUPs. If an
employee had no right of privacy at work, these statements would
not be necessary, they only serve to negate an employee’s
affirmative right to privacy in the workplace which effectively
removes the traditional privacy expectation.
Returning to the novel written during an employee’s lunch
hour using work resources, or even Sarit Shmueli’s client-list, in
the spaces where privacy and the security of electronic
communications overlap, a property right appears to exist. This
property right is founded in the preexisting affirmative right of
privacy and the secured protection over their electronic
communications. Therefore, as this Note suggests when an
employee is able to create a personal electronic document at work,
he or she maintains a property right over that document.
VII. SUGGESTED POLICY
Solutions to this problem can be found on two fronts—through
legislation and the continued use of AUPs. Currently, the ECPA236
is the only national guideline that employers can follow.
Unfortunately, this statute is flawed and insufficient to protect an
employee’s work at the modern company. Additionally, most
current AUP contracts fail to address any property rights
233

See supra Part III. In order for an employer to violate an employee’s
protection, an employer must notify the employee. Therefore, the right remains
with the employee, and can only be legally violated with the employee’s
consent.
234
See supra Part IV.
235
See supra notes 116, 196 and 201 for a further discussion concerning
explicit warnings given to users concerning expectations of privacy in the
workplace.
236
See supra Part III.B.3.
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employees may have over their personal electronic documents.237
Effective AUPs must be drafted which will appropriately guide
employers in how and when they monitor their employees in light
of current technology, and the inherent property right employees
maintain in their personal electronic documents.238
A. Statutory Solution
With the continued evolution of technology, any protections
afforded by the ECPA have become practically irrelevant.239 First,
the ECPA does not apply to forms of surveillance technologies
such as electronic mail monitoring, Internet monitoring, and video
surveillance.240 Also, because the ECPA requires an active
interception of a communication, viewing communications and
documents that are stored on a computer or file server is not a
violation.241 Additionally, aside from piecemeal state regulation,
the ECPA as a national standard benchmark “does not require an
employer to give notice of electronic monitoring practices, nor is
there any other [federal] statute that requires an employer to give
notice of monitoring practices, no matter how invasive the
monitoring may be.”242
If a secured privacy and property right is guaranteed at work,
then an employee would maintain an inherent right over
expressions created at work, utilizing work resources. The
protections afforded by Florida, Connecticut and Delaware provide
237

See supra Part II.C.
The main thrust of this policy is not to decide when and how to monitor
employees, but on how to secure an employee’s property in his or her electronic
documents.
239
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 15.
240
Id. See supra Part II.A for a further discussion of surveillance
technologies used. Under the ECPA an employer is permitted to utilize these
methods.
241
See ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18. U.S.C.). The ECPA only applies when
active interception takes place. Documents stored in a passive state, like
Shmueli’s contact list, are not protected from copying or taking under this
statute. See NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142.
242
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 15.
238
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a solid basis for how, where, and why surveillance should take
place; however, these laws insufficiently protect an employee’s
property right over his or her electronic documents. Under these
statutory frameworks, when an employee assents to the monitoring
and in the course of the surveillance, an employee’s document is
copied—the employee will never be able to assert property interest
over the documents because the notice negated any and all
property rights. Any statutory solution must include provisions that
protect an employee’s property interest. A statutory solution must
secure employees’ property rights over their documents so rigidly
that it can never be signed away through an AUP or negated
through notification standards. Thus, if an employee were to write
the next great American novel on a computer at work, it would
never be owned by his or her employer.
The proposed PCWA of 1990 appears to be the best
springboard to form a sound national policy. Under the PCWA,
employers would have to inform all employees, even prospective
ones, of all the monitoring that takes place in the workplace.
Furthermore, the PCWA would guarantee an employee’s rights
over their First Amendment expressions, for instance the Great
American novel written during a non-paid lunch hour. However,
the PCWA does nothing to protect documents that are taken
without an employee’s knowledge.243 In order “to protect
employees’ privacy rights, uniform standards must be set to govern
monitoring of employees’ communications . . . [in light of] current
technological capabilities.”244 Therefore, the uniform statutory
standard must include notice, audit, and remedies.
Notice will involve a two-part standard. The Delaware Notice
of Monitoring Act is a good starting point for analysis.245 First,
243

Justice Cahn states that an owner does not forfeit his ownership for
failure to take good care of intangible personal property any more than he
forfeits it for failure to take good care of his watch. Shmueli v. Corcoran Group,
802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup. Ct. 2005). Therefore, an employee should be
afforded the same protections when his belongings are taken without his
knowledge. In essence, how can a man call the police to report a stolen watch,
when he didn’t know it was gone in the first place?
244
Green, supra note 231, at 457.
245
19 DEL. C. § 705 (2005). See supra Part III.A for a further discussion.
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employees must be informed of how, when, and why monitoring
will take place. It must be recognized that employees are at work
to work for their employer, not to toil on their own personal
ventures, such as web-surfing, e-mailing, or even writing the next
great American novel. If an employee is able to create personal
work incidental to required tasks, the employer must concede that
the personal work is the property of the employee. Second, if
continuous active monitoring takes place as described, pop-up
notification, similar to the one at issue in Haynes,246 must be
displayed every time users login into their computers informing
them that active monitoring is taking place.
The data and information collected as a result of monitoring
must be subject to audit and review. This facet has not been
addressed by any other previous legislative attempts. Employers
must be allowed to access the data collected upon the showing of
an appropriate and reasonable request. Furthermore, just as
employers are required to report tax and benefit summaries to
employees, they must also include summaries of what information
or personal documents have been collected.
If employees should discover that their electronic documents
have been taken without their knowledge, appropriate remedies
must be available. First, the inherent property right that employees
have over their documents must be recognized. Without an
acknowledgement of the inherent property right that employees
maintain in documents, employees would not have the benefit of
suing for conversion. In addition, employees must be able to seek
appropriate compensatory damages as suggested by the proposed
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act of 2000.247 Under NEMA,
employees could sue for actual and punitive damages, and other
fees, up to $500,000.248

246

Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956 (D. Kan.
Aug. 26, 2005). See supra note 205-208 for a further discussion of other types
of pop-up notifications.
247
H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000). See supra Part III.B.3 for a
further discussion.
248
Id.
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B. Private Solution
Despite the lack of statutory guidance concerning electronic
documents in the workplace, business must continue to function. In
light of the Shmueli249 decision, and in the absence of a national
statutory framework that recognizes an employee’s property right,
employers must continue to provide employees with AUPs.
Current industry standards detailing how employees assent to an
AUP must continue to be followed.250 Under current federal law,
employers are not required to provide their employees with an
AUP251—those that do, do so to satisfy state requirements252 or out
of their own initiative.253
Until a national policy is in place, companies should continue
to provide their employees with AUPs, understanding that
employees maintain an inherent property right over their personal
electronic documents. Any unified policy should and will
recognize an organization’s need to monitor to protect company
assets and ensure employee productivity. However, current AUPs
do nothing to help determine ownership over an electronic
document.254 Rather, current AUPs only make blanket statements
stating that company assets such as computers should be used
solely for business purposes.255 Nevertheless, studies have proven
that employees are using their work computers for personal
purposes.256 Therefore, if employees maintain an inherent property
right over their personal electronic documents and employees are
indeed creating these documents at work, AUPs must address this
issue.
Under current law, as in Shmueli’s holding alone, employees
are able to sue for conversion.257 At the very least, AUPs must
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257

Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92.
See supra Part III.C.
See Porter, supra note 95.
See supra Part II.A.
See Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
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address this problem or companies risk litigation exposure.
Ultimately, an AUP should include the same suggestions as
discussed previously under a suggested statutory solution, such as
notice and audit. Crucially, AUPs should protect the company,
while providing adequate notice to the employee of when and why
electronic monitoring is taking place, while recognizing an
employee’s property right over their electronic documents.
Employees should not be given a blanket right to do what they
wish while at work—employees should still be subject to
disciplinary actions if they are found to violate fundamental
precepts of their work agreement or the AUP.258 Employers,
however, must recognize that if an employee is able to write the
great American novel utilizing work resources, while still
satisfying work requirements, in order to protect the company from
suit exposure and other increased expenses, an AUP must
recognize the employee’s property right over those documents.
CONCLUSION
As computer use in the workplace continues to grow, checks
must be put into place which balance a company’s need to monitor
their employees and control their trade secret and other proprietary
information against an employee’s inherent property right over
their personal electronic documents. Current federal and state
statutes insufficiently secure this right. Although privately drafted
AUPs protect the corporation, they do little to protect employees.
Shmueli illustrates the first official step toward recognizing an
employee’s property right over their documents that is grounded in
the overlap between privacy and the security of electronic
communications. A national policy must recognize this right, but
until then, employers must protect themselves by creating adequate
AUPs to guard the interests of all parties. Employees must satisfy
their work requirements—that is what they are paid to do—not
write the great American novel. However, if an employee is able to
do both, policy, either statutory or privately driven, must reflect the
employee’s property interest.
258

See Porter, supra note 95.
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